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Abstract
Current analyses of pathways limiting global warming to well below 2◦C, as called for in
the Paris Agreement, do not consider the climate impacts already occurring below 2◦C.
Here we show that accounting for these damages significantly increases the near-term
ambition of transformation pathways. We use econometric estimates of climate damages
on GDP growth and explicitly model the uncertainty in the time that damages persist
and in the climate sensitivity. We find that carbon prices in 2030 are higher compared
to the case where only the 2➦C is considered; the median value is ✩115 per tonne of CO2.
The long-term persistence of damages, while highly uncertain, is a main driver of optimal
near-term climate policy. Accounting for damages on economic growth increases the
gap between the currently pledged nationally determined contributions and the welfare-
optimal 2030 emissions for 2➦C by two thirds, compared to pathways considering the 2➦C
limit only.
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Climate-change mitigation is motivated by the risk of large, pervasive and persistent im-
pacts of climate change. Policies aiming to mitigate climate change in a welfare-optimal
way are usually derived from two fundamentally different approaches: cost-benefit anal-
ysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). These approaches account for climate
impacts in different ways. CBA weighs climate damages against mitigation costs to find
optimal temperature levels and climate policies in an integrated model system1–3. A com-
prehensive CBA requires monetizing all climate impacts, including non-market damages,
and allowing trade-offs between costs and benefits even in the presence of deep uncer-
tainty about those. Particularly hard to evaluate is the risk of large-scale, irreversible
disruptions triggered by warming beyond a threshold value (tipping point)4. Examples
include the melting of the ice sheets of Greenland and West Antarctica or the dying of
coral reefs4–6. As a result, many CBA do not account for the risk of climate impacts from
crossing tipping points. The few that do show a significantly larger social cost of carbon
and more ambitious emissions reductions7.
CEA is used to model pathways that minimize mitigation costs subject to a temperature
guardrail. CEA is directly applicable to the climate-policy paradigm of preventing danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system8 and the associated target to keep
warming well below 2➦C or even 1.5➦C9. From an outcome-oriented perspective, CEA is
motivated by temperature guardrails beyond which the risk of climate impacts from pass-
ing tipping points in the Earth System rises rapidly10,11. Another important motivation
for temperature guardrails is the precautionary principle which calls for avoiding areas of
deep uncertainty about the impacts of climate change where trade-offs between costs and
benefits of mitigation can no longer be assessed properly8,12. In its Fifth Assessment Re-
port13 and Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5➦C14 the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change drew on the CEA insights from detailed-process Integrated Assessment
Models15 for its climate mitigation scenario assessment. In contrast to CBA, CEA does
not account for any climate impacts that occur below the temperature guardrail.
With accumulating evidence of economic damages, even at low levels of warming, this
omission becomes increasingly relevant. Gradually intensifying impacts of climate change
include, for example, changes in agricultural yields, water availability, the occurrence
and intensity of extreme events, sea-level rise, effects on health, labor productivity, and
ecosystem services16. Many of these already occur throughout societies and economies
today17. There is evidence that such gradual impacts from climate change can cause
persistent socio-economic effects, for example by affecting long-run economic growth or
societal stability17–20. The uncertainty about the degree of long-term consequences of
such gradual climate damages however, remains large.
The contrast between CBA and CEA can be illustrated in terms of their (implicit) damage
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Figure 1: Explicit or implicit economic damage functions in climate policy
analysis Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) accounts for gradual economic damages in deriving
optimal climate change mitigation pathways (A). Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) seeks
to minimize mitigation costs for limiting warming below a threshold, implicitly assuming
zero damage below and infinite damages above the threshold (B). Least-total cost (LTC)
analysis, as introduced here, combines the two approaches by exploring welfare-optimal
strategies that account for damages occuring below the threshold, while limiting warming
to below the threshold.
cost functions (Fig. 1). The economic damage function in CBA models is continuous and
an explicit element of the analysis. By contrast, the damage function implied by CEA
assumes no damages below the temperature limit and infinite damages above that. Both
can be reconciled in a new integrated assessment paradigm, the Least-Total-Cost (LTC)
approach. LTC pathways are welfare-optimal climate change mitigation strategies for
staying below a long-term temperature in the presence of gradual climate change damages
that already occur below this temperature limit21.
The three main contributions of this study are: First, we construct a damage function
based on empirical damage estimates of temperature increases on GDP that explicitly
reflects uncertainty about the long-term persistence of such gradual climate damages.
Second, we implement LTC pathways in an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) with
high process detail in mitigation technologies. Third, we derive implications for emissions
pathways and near-term ambition for international climate policy.
Persistence of climate damages and the social costs of
carbon
Many empirical studies quantify impacts of global warming on economic output. Recent
studies find impacts through changes in the growth rate of GDP with increasing temper-
atures18,22–26. These studies are not conclusive about whether the income reductions due
to these growth damages are temporary, called a “level effect”, or permanent, termed a
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“growth effect” by Burke et al. [23] - abbreviated BHM15 in the following. The pres-
ence of growth effects implies a slow or no recovery from income damages from global
warming.
Most integrated analyses of impacts and mitigation, however, model damages purely as
level effects. Technically, this is implemented as a contemporaneous reduction in economic
output through a damage function3,27,28. The damage function in a given year is assumed
to be affected only by temperature in that year, but not by temperature in the past.
In these models, economic growth is, except through investment effects, not affected by
rising temperatures. These studies commonly find moderate overall damages and costs
from global warming.
A number of recent studies, by contrast, model economic climate damages as growth rate
effects. Such studies find much higher overall damages23,29 and consequently much more
stringent optimal mitigation action30–34. Two controversial aspects in those studies are the
application of the empirical estimates for out-of-sample climate change in the future and
the implied total lack of adaptation despite continually increasing climate impacts.
The question of whether level or growth effects are more dominant - with the resulting
stark differences in the long-term consequences - is thus a key driver and source of un-
certainty of long-term economic impacts of global warming35. Piontek et al. [36] show
that cumulative climate damages depend on the persistence of annual climate impacts.
This persistence depends in turn on whether output losses, impacts on production factors
or labor productivity are incurred. These different impact channels are not comprhen-
sively quantified as of today. Consequently, our study includes the persistence time -
the typical time a damage in a given year persists into the future - as a key parameter.
This parametric approach to macro-economic damages better captures the out-of-sample
uncertainty due to economic impact channels and the scope for adaptation under future
climate change. A range of persistence times interpolates between a level effect (a persis-
tence time of zero) and growth effect (a persistence time of infinity), thus allowing to spell
out the consequences of the uncertainty over damage estimates on mitigation policy.
To compare different empirical damage specifications and persistence times, we calculate
the social cost of carbon (SCC), that is, the damage caused by the additional emission
of one ton of CO2. We use the IAM REMIND (see next section for details) to derive
the SCC in the welfare-optimal model solution. The persistence time strongly influences
the SCC (Fig. 2): Whereas the SCC is 201✩/(tCO2)for the original specification from
BHM15 with its infinite persistence time (consistent with Ricke et al. [29]), it is only
9✩/(tCO2)for a persistence time of zero years. The often used damage function from the
DICE2016 model, for comparison, yields an SCC of 11✩/(tCO2).
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Figure 2: The social costs of carbon in 2030 critically depend on the persis-
tence of damages. Shown for different damage functions, implemented as a CBA in
the REMIND model. Shown persistence times are 5, 15, and 30 years. Ranges are the
20-80th percentile interval over the two empirical damage specifications from BHM15 (see
Supplement for details) and climate uncertainty. Infinite persistence is the original spec-
ification from BHM15. A persistence time of zero and the DICE2016 damage function
are included for comparison. The dashed line is the value of the SCC put forward by the
Interagency Working Group on Social Costs of Greenhouse Gases (for a discount rate of
5%).
In agreement with the CBA literature33,34, the resulting level of warming in our model is
1.7➦C above pre-industrial for the original BHM15 damage function with infinite persis-
tence. By contrast, the DICE2016 damage function - without any persistence in damages
- results in a warming of 2.7➦C above pre-industrial in our model. In recent literature, pa-
rameter updates for the DICE model37 yield optimal temperatures below 2◦C. DICE-like
models, in contrast to detailed-process IAMs, typically neither have the regional resolu-
tion nor the representation of mitigation technologies in the energy and land sector that
enables meaningful modeling of near-term mitigation pathways.
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Modeling mitigation pathways with climate damages
We use the IAM REMIND to derive welfare-optimal transformation pathways. REMIND
includes an energy-system representation with high process detail in mitigation and emis-
sions abatement technologies with a Ramsey-type macro-economic growth model and
the reduced-form climate model MAGICC638 (also see Methods). The linked system of
macro-economy, energy- and land-system, climate and climate damages is solved ensuring
full consistency between the various model components (Fig. 3). In contrast to DICE-like
IAMs3,34,39, REMIND has the mitigation technology and energy system detail required
to describe near-term climate policy and its emission response. Consequently, detailed-
process IAMs are key contributers to international climate policy assessments13,14.
Figure 3: Illustration of the Integrated Assessment Model REMIND Emission
and GDP pathways derived in the REMIND core model are fed into the climate model
MAGICC6; resulting in temperature and the temperature impulse responses. Climate
damages, the social cost of carbon and the guardrail tax are calculated from this infor-
mation, and used in the next iteration of the REMIND core model. At the fixed point
of this iteration, the solution is the same as if a single numerical optimization model was
run (Supplementary Material, Section 2).
Welfare-optimal pathways for gradual damages and a
temperature guardrail
Whereas the social cost of carbon in the CBA accounts for the gradual climate dam-
ages based on empirical estimates, the well-below-2➦C temperature guardrail of the Paris
Agreement is largely motivated by the precautionary principle, in view of tipping ele-
ments and potentially unknown climate impacts if warming increases beyond the range
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experienced in the Holocene10.
Our model framework includes both gradual damages and a temperature guardrail (Fig.
1c). LTC pathways minimize the sum of mitigation costs for limiting warming to below
the guardrail and the costs of economic damages. It is known from the theoretical lit-
erature that in the presence of both climate damages and a temperature guardrail, the
welfare-optimal carbon price is the sum of the SCC and a price component related to the
temperature guardrail21. In our model, the LTC pathway contains an additional emissions
price component, if required in order to keep temperature increase below 2◦C. This price
component, the shadow price of the temperature guardrail, is called guardrail tax in the
following. The guardrail tax rises exponentially at the interest rate, following Hotelling’s
rule13,40, until carbon emissions go to zero. After that, the guardrail tax is adjusted to
keep carbon emissions at zero.
The welfare-optimal carbon price in our framework is thus the sum of the SCC and the
guardrail tax at the solution point of our model framework (Section 2 of the Supple-
mentary Material). The optimal carbon price is globally uniform, levied as a tax on all
greenhouse gas emissions, and implemented from 2025 on. The tax revenue is redistributed
lump-sum to households.
To better understand the distinctive features of LTC pathways, we also implement CEA
pathways, which minimize only the cost of limiting warming to below a temperature
guardrail. Gradual climate impacts still do occur in the CEA pathways, but are not
reflected in the carbon price - the carbon price in CEA consists only of the guardrail
tax.
In comparing LTC with CEA pathways, we include three key components of uncertainty:
(i) the persistence time in the damage function; (ii) physical uncertainties in the climate
system; (iii) future socio-economic, demographic, technological and institutional develop-
ment.
The damage function uses estimates from two empirical specifications from BHM15 for
the reduction of GDP growth through local temperature changes, called “long-run” and
“short-run”. In contrast to their original construction of damage functions based on these
estimates, we express the uncertainty over the persistence time scale by using a model
ensemble with persistence times of 5, 15, and 30 years, as well as their original esti-
mate (with the implied infinite persistence time). Together, the product of two empirical
specifications and four persistence times yield eight damage specifications that span the
damage-related dimension of the model run ensemble.
Physical uncertainties in the climate system are covered by sampling configurations of the
MAGICC6 model along temperature outcomes. Different possible future socioeconomic
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trends are represented by different assumptions described by the Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs)1, 2, and 541,42 . We sample 80 runs of the REMIND model system along
the damage and climate physics uncertainty dimensions under SSP2 as the ensemble for
the main results. Additionally, we sample another 80 runs each for SSP1 and 5 for a
sensitivity analysis – the full ensemble including all three SSPs is 240 runs.
Near-term emission reduction efforts and the adequacy
of the nationally determined contributions
Figure 4: Carbon prices for 2➦C in welfare-optimal LTC pathways (blue) are
higher in the near-term than for CEA (red). (a) Median carbon prices in 2030
are ✩115 (✩85-218) for LTC, significantly above the ✩61 (✩57-63) for CEA. The range
in brackets are the 20th-80th percentiles, also indicated in dark ribbons in the plot;
light ribbons are the min-max range. (b) Higher near-term carbon prices of LTC are
mirrored by lower prices from 2050 on; ribbons as in a. (c) Effect of different socio-
economic baselines. (d) Uncertainty decomposition of the full ensemble of 240 runs into
contributions of socio-economic baseline, climate, and impact specifications.
The difference in near-term carbon prices between LTC and CEA pathways for the 2➦C
limit is large (Fig. 5a). In 2030, the LTC carbon price is ✩115 (✩85-218), as against
✩61 (✩57-63) in the CEA case (single numbers are medians and brackets the 20-80th
percentile range of the ensemble for SSP2 only, unless otherwise stated; all dollar values
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are US✩2015.). Whereas the CEA carbon price rises exponentially over time, the LTC
carbon price rises much slower (Fig. 4b). A consequence of the high near-term ambition
in the LTC pathway is that in the long term, much lower carbon prices are required to
reach the 2➦C target than in the CEA pathway.
These results are robust against different socio-economic baselines: Larger challenges
for mitigation, such as in SSP5, require higher carbon prices than baselines with lower
challenges, such as SSP1, to meet the 2➦C limit (Fig. 5c). This is consistent with earlier
studies42. The range of 2030 carbon prices is dominated by uncertainty about the damage
function in LTC pathways, whereas uncertainty about socio-economic baselines explains
most of the range of CEA carbon prices of the full scenario ensemble (Fig. 5d). Compared
to the range of LTC pathways, the range of CEA pathways is much smaller. Note that
the uncertainty for CEA pathways would be larger if the uncertainty about the carbon
budget for 2➦C would be included (see Supplementary Figure 5 for other temperature
targets).
Near-term emission reductions are more stringent in the median LTC pathway than in
the CEA counterpart. In 2030, global CO2 emissions are 28 (23-31) GtCO2 in the LTC
paradigm, compared to 33 (33-33) GtCO2 for CEA. The near-term ambition of the median
LTC pathway is similar to 1.5➦C pathways with temperature overshoot from the SR1.5
(median 29.1 Gt CO2), whereas the CEA pathway is in line with their higher-2➦C scenarios
(median 33.5 Gt CO2). The gap between 2030 emissions projected under the currently
pledged nationally determined contributions (taken from the SR1.5 database) and the
welfare-optimal LTC pathway for the 2➦C limit is two thirds larger compared to what a
CEA assessment indicates. In the median LTC pathway, the average emission reduction
rate from 2020 to 2030 is 3.2% yr−1, around double the rate of the median CEA pathway
- indicating the much higher near-term mitigation effort.
To sum up, CEA pathways systematically underestimate the optimal near-term policy
ambition and overestimate the long-term ambition if climate damages are non-negligible
below warming levels of 2➦C. This conclusion holds for other temperature limits as well,
but the difference between LTC and CEA decreases with increasing stringency of the
temperature limit, with only a minor effect remaining for 1.5➦C pathways (Supplementary
Material).
Conclusion
The climate crisis is a great challenge of the 21st century. Mitigation policies, in particular
the ambition of mitigation efforts in the current decade, not only influence the likelihood
of meeting the temperature limit set forth in the Paris Agreement, but also the severity
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Figure 5: Global CO2-only emissions for 2➦C in welfare-optimal LTC pathways
(blue) are below emissions for CEA (red) in the near term. Projections under the
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (yellow) are included. (a) Median emissions
in 2030 are 28 (23-31) GtCO2 yr
−1for LTC, significantly below the 33 (33-33) GtCO2
yr−1for CEA, increasing the gap to the NDCs. The range in brackets are the 20th-
80th percentiles, also indicated in dark ribbons in the plot; light ribbons are the min-
max range. (b) Lower near-term emissions of LTC are mirrored by higher emissions
from 2050 on. (c) Effect of different socio-economic baselines on 2030 emissions. (d)
Uncertainty decomposition of the full ensemble of 240 runs into contributions of socio-
economic baseline, climate, and impact specifications. See Supplementary Figure 3 for a
plot that includes many greenhouse gases.
of climate impacts realized. Whereas the policy debate largely focuses on the impacts
beyond the 1.5➦C and 2➦C thresholds, near-term impacts at lower warming levels can be
substantial and have persistent consequences beyond their immediate effect.
This study combines recent empirical damage estimations and modeling of the persis-
tence time, a key uncertainty, into a new damage function. This damage function is
evaluated within an IAM with high technological detail and a state-of-the-art climate
model. We demonstrate that welfare-optimal mitigation pathways, minimizing the total
costs of near-term damages and a Paris-based temperature guardrail, result in substan-
tially greater near-term mitigation efforts than a pure cost-effectiveness analysis. A pure
cost-effectiveness analysis, which postpones climate policy ambition until later in the
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century, yields more costly pathways to achieving the 2➦C target than least-total cost
pathways.
Future research could include damages beyond reductions in economic output. To reduce
the uncertainty over optimal policies, it is crucial to further the empirical understanding
of channels of impacts, their persistence over time, and adaptation to them.
Despite the significant uncertainties, our results have important implications for climate
policy. Previous research based on cost-effectiveness analysis has pointed to the inade-
quacy of currently committed mitigation efforts to achieve the Paris Agreement at lowest
cost. Our results demonstrate that current climate policy efforts fall even shorter than
previously thought as soon as climate damages below the temperature threshold are taken
into account. Therefore we argue that the LTC approach is a better guideline to climate
policy in particular with respect to near-term action.
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Model framework We assess trade-offs between CEA and LTC mitigation pathways
for the 2◦C target by modeling both in an energy-economy-climate model framework. Our
model framework can be classified as a detailed process IAM (DP-IAM)15,28. Such DP-
IAMs were used extensively in the AR5 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
for quantitative analysis of transformation pathways. An earlier version of our model
framework, the REMIND model, was one of the major contributors to the AR5 and SR15
scenario database43,44. Transformation pathways explored in the AR5, however, do not
include climate impacts. Cost-benefit IAMs1–3, by contrast, are models that do include
climate impacts, but have less process detail and are thus not as useful in describing
transformation pathways. In this paper, we aim (a) to demonstrate the importance of
economic climate impacts for optimal climate change mitigation strategies, and (b) to
quantify how crucial uncertainties affect these optimal strategies. We do so by integrating
climate impact estimates into our DP-IAM, and contrasting CEA pathways that follow
the rationale of the models used in the AR5, which do not reflect climate impacts in the
price of carbon emissions, with welfare-optimal transformation pathways, named LTC
pathways. An comparision our of paper with the literature across key features is found
in Supplementary Table 2. The relation of our LTC approach with the CEA and CBA
approaches from the literature is discussed in Section 6 of the Supplementary Material
and Supplementary Figure 9.
We analyse uncertainties and sensitivities along three dimensions: Socio-economic trends,
climate system physics, and climate damage estimates. Assuming realizations across these
three dimensions to be equally likely and independent, we use a full factorial ensemble
design of 80 models for the ensemble for the main results (SSP2 only) and 240 model
runs (SSP1, 2, and 5) for the full ensemble runs. The ensemble range in an outcome is
then a measure of its uncertainty. We explain all three uncertainty dimensions in this
Methods section starting from from socio-economic scenarios as drivers of emissions, to
the climate system, and to climate impacts. The focus in this Methods section is on our
two main methodological contributions: a damage function reflecting finite persistence of
damages over time and a method to derive welfare-optimal climate policy in a coupled
energy-economy-climate model.
Socio-economic and energy systems We use the energy-economy model REMIND-
Luderer et al. [45] in its version 2.1. The source code of REMIND is available open source
at . Its core is a welfare-maximizing, Ramsey-type general equilibrium model with eleven
world regions that spans the 21st century46,47. Regional utilities are aggregated into global
welfare using Negishi weights (thus equalizing the utilities of one additional unit of con-
sumption across regions). The energy system model, hard-coupled to the economic core,
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captures inertia and path-dependencies by representing more than 50 energy conversion
technologies as capital stocks, subject to adjustment costs. Energy prices reflect resource
scarcities, resource trade, and final energy taxes. This combination of both high detail
in abatement options and long-term scope allows for the assessment of near-term climate
policies compatible with long-term climate targets48–50. The most relevant greenhouse gas
emissions in energy and land-use systems are accounted for45.
Future developments of populations, economies, technologies, and institutions are highly
uncertain. These socio-economic uncertainties are reflected in three different baselines
consistent with the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs)41: Sustainable development
in SSP1, a fossil-fuel intensive high growth scenario in SSP5, and the middle-of-the-road
scenario SSP2. Assumptions for the global population in 2100 stretch from 7 to 9 billion51
across scenarios. GDP per capita in 2050 is around twice as high in SSP5 as in SSP152.
Energy demand in 2100 is assumed to be more than double and baseline emissions are
around double already in 2050 in SSP5 compared to SSP142. Baseline radiative forcing in
2100 is slightly above RCP8.5 for SSP5, indicating high challenges, and somewhat below
RCP6.0 for SSP1, indicating lower challenges for mitigation42.
Climate system We use MAGICC638, iteratively soft-coupled to REMIND, to trans-
late greenhouse gas emissions into global mean temperature change. MAGICC6 emulates
the results from atmosphere-ocean general circulation models well53 and has been used
extensively by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change13. Temperature increase
has been assessed to be approximately linear in cumulative CO2 emissions (see also Sup-
plementary Figure 4), though this relationship is subject to large uncertainties38,54–56.
This uncertainty is accounted for by different MAGICC6 parameter configurations repre-
sentative of the spread in temperature outcomes. From a probabilistic run of MAGICC6
with 600 outcomes for an RCP2.6 emissions scenario, we select MAGICC6 configurations
at certain percentiles of the temperature distribution in 2100. To quantify the influence of
climate uncertainty in our results, we run the model framework using configurations at the
5th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 95th percentile. Regional temperatures, which drive the dam-
age functions, are derived from global mean temperature using a statistical downscaling
based on CMIP5 results57 (Section 3 of the Supplementary Material).
Climate impacts Our climate damage specification is based on the empirical findings
of Burke et al. [23] and derived in full detail in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material.
Burke et al. [23] use year-to-year temperature variation to identify the effect of tempera-
ture on economic growth. Their main finding is a nonlinear dependence of GDP growth
on the climate only through local temperature. Damages to the growth rate, in contrast
to previously assumed damages to the level of GDP58, have recently come into focus in the
literature since they result in persistent and much larger economic impacts35,59–61. There
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is some ambiguity in the estimates of Burke et al. [23] on whether temperature affects the
growth rate or the level of GDP and consequently on how persistent those impacts are in
the long term62. To reflect this uncertainty we use two different empirical specifications
and parameterize a finite persistence time.
We use two different specifications of the climate-dependent GDP growth rate h(T ) from
Burke et al. [23]: 1) The central estimate in which only the temperature in a given year
affects GDP growth in that year (”short run”) – it shows positive marginal effects on the
growth rate of GDP in countries with an average temperature below ∼ 13◦C and strongly
negative effects at higher temperatures. 2) A specification derived by regressing GDP
growth on the last five year’s temperatures (”long run”) – it shows negative marginal
growth effects at all temperatures.
In the damage function δr,t, the specification h(T ) reduces the growth rate of GDP in
every year t in which yearly average temperature Tr,t in region r is above the base year’s
temperature T¯r:
δr,t = h(Tr,t)− h(T¯r).
Typical values for the global aggregate of δr,t are somewhat smaller than in, for example,
DICE2016 (Supplementary Figure 1a), although these two damage functions are not fully
comparable: DICE-like damage functions describe the reduction in the level of GDP,
whereas our damage function describes growth rate reductions that may persist and com-
pound over time. Burke et al. [23] show that there is some evidence of persistence in the
damages, but also note that the degree of persistence is highly uncertain. By parameter-
izing the degree of persistence we reflect two key uncertainties: The persistence of climate
damages and possible future adaptations to those damages.
The empirical specifications we use reflect adaptations to increasing temperatures to the
degree they occurred between 1960-201023 through the finite persistence time. In our
parameterization of persistence, the effect of each single damage shock δr,t declines expo-
nentially over time. We do not know of reliable empirical estimates of the typical half-time
of climate damage shocks on GDP. There are, however, some indications: Dell et al. [59]
conclude that climate damages on GDP persist for at least 10-15 years, and Dell et al.
[63] find that only around half of the GDP damages are offset in the long term. Impacts
of hurricanes on economic growth, as an example of climatic extreme events, have been
shown to persist beyond 20 years64. For the time τH after that half of the damage shock
remains, we choose a range from an optimistic 5 years to a rather pessimistic 30 years











reduces before-damage GDP Yr,t according to
Y¯r,t = Yr,tDr,t.
The damage factor translates growth rate damages from the damage function into a re-
duction of the level of GDP. Our assumption of a finite and non-zero persistence time τH
interpolates between two extreme cases found in the literature, as illustrated in Supple-
mentary Figure 2: No persistence at all in DICE-like damage functions3 (a temperature
shock in one year means D < 1 only in that year), in contrast to infinite persistence, as
in the damage factor of Burke et al. [23] or Pindyck [60] (a temperature shock in one
year means D < 1 for all future). With a finite persistence time we effectively assume
that the damages due to one year with above-historical-average temperatures eventually
disappear: there is always a ”return to trend” (D → 1) in the long run. This also implies
that after stabilizing temperature at a level above today’s, damages are still incurred
every year; this is the case in most of the literature2,3,27,58,60.
Our preferred damage function specification leads to a median damage of around 9% of
GDP in 2100 across the LTC pathways – a much higher damage than in, for example,
DICE2016, but significantly less than in the original Burke estimates (Supplementary
Figure 1). The magnitude of our main result – near-term climate policy is more stringent
in LTC than in CEA pathways – depends strongly on the damage function, as illustrated
in Supplementary Figure 9.
Climate policies We derive the two components of the optimal carbon price, the SCC
and the guardrail tax, consistently in our model framework (for technical details, see
Section 2 of the Supplementary Material). In brief, we find analytical expressions for
both price components in a reduced model (i.e., the relevant first-order conditions of the
optimization problem), evaluate them using variables from the REMIND and MAGICC6
models and iteratively price them into REMIND as taxes on emissions. The SCC pt is











′−t′′)/τH Θr′,t′,t′′ κr′,t′′ ∆Tt′′,t. (2)
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It depends on regional GDPs as well as the discount factor Φt′,t from the REMIND
model, damage factors, the derivative of the damage function with respect to temperature
Θr′,t′,t′′ , regional temperatures (through κr′,t′′), and the temperature impulse response to
an additional unit of emissions ∆Tt′′,t.
We derive the temperature impulse response from MAGICC6 using a pulse experiment
(Supplementary Figure 4b). The solution of this coupled model framework is almost
identical to the case in which the framework’s components were combined into a single
optimization model (as is the case for traditional Integrated Assessment Models such
as DICE). Our method has the advantage of decoupling the complexities of the climate
system and the damage function from the REMIND model while keeping all relevant
interactions, allowing for greater modelling detail on all sides.
We implement the temperature guardrail as a limited CO2 budget until the time of CO2
neutrality; the stringency of this budget approximately determines the temperature at
peak warming40. As an implementation of the 2◦C limit we use a budget of 1300 Gt CO2
from 2011 onwards, which is derived from the budgets given in Chapter 2 of the SR1.514
for 67% likelihood of stabilizing below 2◦. As long as cumulative emissions are below the
budget, the guardrail tax takes the well-known Hotelling form and rises exponentially at
the interest rate13. After the budget constraint has been reached - which happens around
2070 in most pathways - the level of the guardrail tax is adjusted to keep CO2 emissions
to zero.
Both carbon price components are globally uniform, as the socially optimal policy takes
into account the global effects of each region’s emissions. The optimal carbon tax is
levied on CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions, aggregated using global warming potentials
65.
We assume that the resulting tax revenue is recycled lump-sum to households in each
model region. All of our pathways assume the full availability of mitigation technologies.
The LTC pathways are welfare-optimal (”first-best”) in the sense that the temperature
target and the social cost of carbon are both fully internalized. By contrast, in CEA
pathways are sub-optimal (”second-best”) in the sense that although the temperature
target is internalized, climate damages expressed in the social cost of carbon are not,
even though the damages are present.
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1 Climate damages
1.1 Damage estimates
Our damage function is based on the empirical estimates of Burke et al. [1]. They find
a nonlinear dependence of GDP growth on the climate that only depends on the average
yearly temperature of a specific country. The climate-dependent part of the GDP growth
rate h depends on local temperature Tr,t through
h(Tr,t) = β1Tr,t + β2T
2
r,t. (1)
We use two different empirical specifications for the β parameters: In the ”short run” spec-
ification marginal GDP effects are positive at temperatures below ∼ 13◦C, but strongly
negative at higher temperatures. The ”long run” specification shows negative marginal
effects at all temperatures. The ”short run” specification is derived by regressing GDP
growth in a given year on the temperature in that specific year only. The regression for
the ”long run” specification, by contrast, additionally includes temperature lags of the five
preceding years, reflecting the dynamic reaction to temperature shocks and their persis-
tence. Burke et al. [2] describe this in more detail in their section on level vs. growth rate
effects. By using these two parameter sets we reflect parts of the ambiguity in whether
climate damages affect the growth rate or the level of GDP. Both specifications are repro-
duced by us based on the replication data set by Burke et al.3 and summarized in Table
1.
1.2 Damage function
We derive a damage function and a damage factor for the REMIND model based on the
concept in Burke et al. [2]. Let net GDP (after climate damages) per capita in model
2
β1 β2
short run 0.0127 -0.0005
long run -0.0037 -0.0001
Table 1: Specifications for our damage function (Eq.(1)), derived by us based on the
replication data set of Burke [3].
region r be y¯r,t. Then, break down the GDP growth rate into a growth rate in the absence
of climate change ηr,t and a climate-dependent part δr,t:
y¯r,t = y¯r,t−1 (1 + ηr,t + δr,t) ,
and as both growth rates are smalli,






















In the baseline of the REMIND model (i.e., no climate change impacts, no climate policy)
, GDP Yr,t is calibrated to reproduce trajectories of a given SSP scenario
4 and to GDP
data in 2005. Climate change reduces the growth rate, δr,t > 0, and thus gross GDP
through D′r,t from the base year 2005 on. As gross GDP Yr,t is endogenous to the model,
it may slightly differ from the baseline itself through second order effects, for example
reduced capital accumulationii.
iThis is a good approximation, and we derive here an upper bound on the error caused by it:




(1− ηr,t′δr,t′). The median in absolute error |x − 1| in 2100 across our ensemble of runs is
x < 1%, and the 95th percentile is x < 2%.
iiOne way to interpret this is that we assume the GDP growth rate damages from the literature to
act as total factor productivity growth rate damages in our model. We do this as there is currently no
reliable breakdown of GDP damages into the different drivers of growth. Attributing GDP damages to
total factor productivity damages may result in an overestimation of the income reduction caused by
3
Climate change damages on the growth rate δr,t are driven by the deviation of the regional
annual mean temperature Tr,t from the observed historical mean temperature T¯r through
the damage function
δr,t = h(Tr,t)− h(T¯r), (2)
where T¯r is the historically observed temperature in 2005 (see Section 3 for details).
As Burke et al. [1] note, there is some ambiguity about whether the damages affect the
level or the growth rate of GDP. This is most relevant, as growth rate damages lead to
much larger impacts over time5–8. We use a single formulation to parameterize persistence
of damages and adaptations to damages beyond the historically observed degree: Each
single growth rate damage shock δr,t′ declines exponentially over time t according to
δr,t′2
−(t−t′)/τH . The parameter τH is time after which only half of the initial damage shock
remains. The declining effect of damage shocks over time can be understood as a limited
persistence of the shock or as some unspecified form of costless adaption to the shock that
is autonomously deployed.










To illustrate the persistence mechanism, assume that there is only one region and one
damage shock today at time t′ = 1, so δt′=1 > 0, and δt′ 6=1 = 0. In the resulting damage
factor
Dt≥1 = 1 + δ1 0.5
(t−1)/τH ,
the effect of the damage shock δ1 declines exponentially with t. A DICE-like damage
factor does not show persistence9,10, τH = 0, such that the effect of the damage δ1 would
only last for one year. On the other end, an infinite persistence time1,5, τH →∞, means
that the effect of the damage δ1 is permanent, as Dt < 1. In our study, we assume finite
and non-zero persistence times, interpolating in between these two extreme cases found
in the literature.
We emphasize that our inclusion of the declining effect of damage shocks (or equivalently
here: adaptation) results in a significant weakening of the damage factors found in Burke
et al. [1], as we effectively assume that no climate damages do persist in the very long
climate change. For our application though, these effects are dominated by the large uncertainties in
damage estimates, which we parametrize in the persistence/adaptation mechanism.
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run. The damage factor used in Burke et al. [1], by contrast, corresponds to an infinite
persistence time (τH →∞).
Our low end estimate of a persistence time of 5 years requires adaptation beyond what is
observed historically in order to be consistent with the empirical estimates cited above.
Missing reliable data, we assume that adaptation measures are deployed optimally, au-
tonomously, and at no cost. This results in a downwards bias of our estimates of the costs
of climate impacts as adaptation measures in the real world are costly and not deployed
without effort.
2 Internalizing climate damages and temperature tar-
gets
In this section we describe the integration of climate damages and the social cost of carbon
(SCC), as well as temperature targets and the according guardrail tax, into the REMIND
model. Our derivation of the expressions for the SCC borrows from the literature11–13,
but is somewhat more involved due to our inclusion of growth rate damage.
We derive an analytical expression for the SCC and the guardrail tax in a reduced model,
and levy those in the REMIND model as taxes on emissions. In effect, the solution
is the same as if calculated within a fully endogenous cost-benefit optimization (under
an additional temperature constraint), even though we evaluate the SCC and guardrail
tax iteratively outside the REMIND optimization. This allows inclusion of additional
complexity along the causal chain from emissions to temperature to damages, such as for
example the MAGICC6 climate model.
The two concerns for climate change here, a temperature target and damages, lead to two
carbon price components, their sum being the optimal carbon tax at the fix point of the
iteration. We use a reduced model mimicking REMIND to derive the first-order condition
for the optimal carbon tax by comparing the baseline solution (i.e., climate change is an
externality) to the socially optimal solution (i.e., climate damages and a temperature
target are fully internalized).
First, consider a single, independent model region as a Ramsey model with one year
time steps t. Utility U is standard (i.e., constant relative risk aversion), depends only on
regional per capita consumption cr,t; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is η
−1 and
the pure rate of time preference is ρ. Capital Kr,t is accumulated endogenously through
investments Ir,t through Ir,t = Kr,t+1 − (1− δk)Kr,t, in which δk is the depreciation rate.
Population Nr,t is exogenous. Capital variable names denote here economy-wide values
in contrast to per capita values in small letters (for example for GDP: Yr,t = yr,tNr,t).
5
Production Yr,t(Er,t) has regional emissions as an input, meaning there is some value of
emissions in production. Γr,t is a unit tax on emissions. The constant E
′
r,t stands for last
iteration’s emissions, does not influence the first order conditions, and is explained later
on in this section – think of it as being zero for now.
















There are climate damages D(Tr,t) that depend on regional temperatures Tr,t and a dam-
age term associated with the temperature limit Λ(Tt) that depends on global mean tem-
perature Tt only. The term Λ(Tt) is zero below the temperature limit and unity above
the limit.
In the first-order condition associated with emissions Er,t the terms involving D and Λ
are additiveiv. Consequently we split up the carbon tax Γr,t in two parts,
Γr,t = pr,t + τr,t, (5)
and derive the expression for the SCC pr,t and the guardrail tax τr,t separately in the
following two sections.
2.1 Expression for the SCC
















We solve this Lagrangian for a regional social planner, with full control over consumption
cr,t, capital stock Kr,t, and emissions Er,t. The first order conditions are the following:
iiiThe time horizon is T = 2150, and we do not list the associated complementary-slackness conditions
here. In the REMIND model, we make sure these conditions are fulfilled. Furthermore, we define climate
targets until the year 2100 and use only results until that year; the extended model horizon until 2150
minimizes the influence of the model’s finite time on the results. The horizon of the SCC calculation can
be chosen to be different from the one of the REMIND model itself; a sensitivity analysis shows that this
affects the optimal carbon tax, with stronger effects for a smaller time horizon than for an extended one.
ivOur results do not depend on the assumption of the two damage terms being additive in the La-
grangian. Similar results can be derived for multiplicative damages on output or utility damages due to
the temperature limit.
6
First, the shadow price of consumption is
λr,t = ωr c
−η
r,t (1 + ρ)
−t ∀ t, r. (7)
Second, in combination with the first order condition for capital accumulation, a Ramsey
rule results
1 + rr,t ≡
∂y¯r,t
∂Kr,t





∀ t, r (8)
which defines the interest rate rr,t. Third, the marginal value of emissions in production




∀ t, r. (9)
In this baseline solution, each region does not recognize the link between their own emis-
sions Er,t and global temperature, and consequently, climate damages – climate change is
fully external.
In contrast to the solution of a single region, consider the globally social optimal solution








ωrNr,tU(cr,t) (1 + ρ)
−t + λr,t (Yr,t(Er,t)D(Tr,t)− cr,tNr,t − Ir,t)
)
. (10)
Production damages depend on regional temperature D(Tr,t) and the social planner re-
alizes that temperature is a function of past global emissions Tr,t(Et, Et−1, .., E0). The
first two first-order conditions are unchanged, but the marginal value of emissions in













∀ t, r (11)
Comparing Eq. (11) to Eq. (9) gives the optimal, regional carbon tax that decentralizes


















































∆Tr′,t′′,t is the temperature response at time t
′′ to an emissions pulse at t and it is zero for
t′′ < t (by way of causality). It does not depend on regional, but only on global emissions











′−t′′)/τH Θr′,t′,t′′ ∆Tr′,t′′,t (12)
In the following, I discuss three factors in this expression: temperature response to emis-
sions, marginal damages, and welfare weights.
Temperature response
The regional temperature response to global emissions ∆Tr′,t′′,t is derived in two steps:















The shape of the TIR and its derivation in our model framework is discussed in detail in
section 4.




by replacing the dependence on the emission time t with a dependence on a certain emis-
sions scenario. Concretely, κr,t′ is the scaling from global mean temperature to regional
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temperature, evaluated for a given RCP scenario. The details of the underlying statistical
downscaling are described in Section 3.
Taken together, the temperature response is
∆Tr,t′,t = κr,t′ ∆Tt′,t.
Marginal damages









The factor in the parenthesis is very close to 1. The derivative follows from the definition






= (β1 + 2β2Tr,t)
Welfare weights and discount factor
We assume the welfare weights ωr to be Negishi weights, which is a common choice in the
literature. Negishi weights equalize the marginal utility of consumption across regions. We
verify numerically that the time-independent Negishi weights ωr in a converged REMIND










We use this expression to simplify the Lagrange multiplier of the budget equation to:
λr′,t′ = ωr′c
−η














vFor detail on the solution procedure of such a run, see Leimbach et al. [14].
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where we suppress the regional dependence as trade in capital good in the REMIND
model leads to a globally uniform interest rate rt.
Finally, putting together expressions for temperature response, marginal damages, and










′−t′′)/τH Θr′,t′,t′′ κr′,t′′ ∆Tt′′,t, (14)
where we set η = 1. Equation (15) is the discounted sum of future marginal damages due
to the temperature increase of an additional unit of emissions. As we consider growth
rate damages, marginal damages along the entire growth path have to be summed up
(the t′′ sum in the expression), weighted by their persistence. This equation nests the
special case of damages without persistence (τH = 0), in which case an expression similar
to the ones in the literature can be recovered11–13. The SCC is globally uniform (Eq.15 is
independent of index r ).
An estimate for the SCC can be dervied by a back-of-the-envelope calculation. Assume a
global version of our model with constant GDP growth at 2%, a constant interest rate of
5%, instantaneous rise of temperature with emissions (not a bad assumption considering
Fig. 4), damages of a couple of percent of GDP only such that Dr,t ≈ 1. From Fig. 1, a
rough estimate for the marginal damages with temperature is Θ ≈ 0.6. The scaling factor



































For an estimate of the 2030 SCC, plug in our pathway’s mean GDP in 2030 of Yt = US✩90
trillion and τH = 30 years. TCRE is estimated at 0.0015
◦C per GtC (Fig. 4). The inner
sum sums up declining damages over time; it grow from 1 to around 30 over time t′.
Numerically evaluting this expression gives an SCC of p2030 ≈ 150 US✩ per tonne of CO2
– not too far from the median optimal carbon tax of 115 US✩ per tonne of CO2 from the
full analysis.
2.2 Guardrail tax
The guardrail tax τr,t internalizes a limit on global mean temperature TLIM.
We implement the temperature guardrail as a limited CO2 budget until the time of CO2
neutrality; the stringency of this budget approximately determines the temperature at
peak warming15. As an implementation of the 2◦C limit we use a budget of 1300 Gt CO2
from 2011 onwards, which is derived from the budgets given in Chapter 2 of the SR1.516
for 67% likelihood of stabilizing below 2◦.
As long as cumulative emissions are below the budget, the guardrail tax takes the well-
known Hotelling form and rises exponentially at the interest rate17. After the budget
constraint has been reached - which happens around 2070 in most pathways - the level of
the guardrail tax is adjusted to keep CO2 emissions to zero.
Most CEA models in the literature (i.e., cost-effectiveness models without climate im-
pacts) and most Integrated Assessment Models used for the Fifth Assessment Report of
the IPCC show a Hotelling-like carbon price pathvi.
2.3 Integration into REMIND
The expression for the SCC (Eq. 15) is evaluated for paths for consumption, GDP, and
interest rates from REMINDvii, as well as temperature paths from the MAGICC6 model.
We limit the time horizon for the SCC evaluation to 100 years by default, T = t + 100.
Because the results depend on the horizon19, we show a sensitvity analysis with respect
to the time horizon in Supplementary Figure ??. As the SCC evaluation may involve
model variables at times beyond the end of the REMIND horizon (2150), we extrapolate
GDP, consumption, temperature, and temperature impulse response as constant after
2150.
This SCC price path is then fed back into the REMIND model, and the procedure is
iterated to a fixed point. In effect, the first order-condition for optimal emissions Eq.
viMost models in the Fifth Assessment Report show Hotelling-like behaviour: Across all models that
reach the 430-480ppm climate target with immediate climate policy and full technology choice, the median
decadal carbon price growth rate until 2100 is 2.8-5.5% per year (annualized)17,18.
viithe interest rate falls from 6% p.a. to 4% p.a. throughout the century in an exemplary SSP2
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(15) is satisfied asymptotically. The guardrail tax τr,t is fed into the REMIND model
as well, either by adjusting the level of a Hotelling tax path until the emissions budget
associated with the given temperature targets is observed, or by evaluating Eq. ?? in
the case of a not-to-exceed temperature limit. We argue that the resulting solution is the
same (or at least very similar) to the one where the full causal chain from emissions to
temperature to damages were endogenously included in the model – which we elaborate
on in Section 2.4.
In the REMIND model, only the difference to last iteration’s emissions E
′
r,t is priced in:








approaches zero at the fixed point of the iteration, but the marginal emission is still priced
at pr,t+ τr,t. The welfare-economic assumption behind that is that lump-sum tax revenue
recycling is possible within every region. Although the temperature path calculated by
MAGICC6 is based on detailed emissions paths of different greenhouse gases species from
REMIND, we aggregate emissions using global warming potentials into CO2 equivalents
to price them in according to Eq. 16.
2.4 Equivalence of endogenous to iterative method
We argue here that the iterative solution of our soft-coupled model framework is very
close to the solution where the entire causal chain from emissions to damages would be
endogenously included in one hard-coupled model. From theory, there is little reason to
expect the solutions would differ. At the fixed point of the iteration, at which pr,t and
τr,t are converged, the first-order conditions of our reduced model as well as the ones
of REMIND are fulfilled: The ones from the reduced model that determine the optimal
carbon prices by construction of the iterative solution algorithm and all the other ones
implicitly as a result of the REMIND optimization. As there are no links from emissions
to temperature or climate impacts in REMIND except for the ones also covered by our
reduced model, all the relevant first-order conditions are fulfilled.
Comparing the solutions of the iterative and the endogenous formulation numerically
requires a simple climate model, as it is infeasible to include the full MAGICC6 climate
model into REMIND due to the numerical complexity of both models. We thus choose
a very stylized climate model: Temperature rises instantaneously with emissions (which
is the ks → ∞ limit the model in Eq.(3) of Allen [20]). This very stylized temperature
impulse response function still bears resemblance to the one derived by MAGICC6.
We benchmark our iterative solution against the endogenous formulation in which a social
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planner derives the globally optimal climate policyviii. Both model formulations use the
same stylized climate model and damage functions. The two solutions – the one for the
iterative model and the endogenous model – are very close: The maximum deviation
of the emission time paths throughout the 21st century is below 1% of today’s global
emissions.
3 Temperature downscaling
We describe regional temperature Tr,t as a function of global mean temperature Tt (from
MAGICC6) through a statistical downscaling approach based on the multi-model data
set from CMIP521.
Take T˜r,2005 to be the historically observed temperature in 2005, calculated as the average
temperature from from 2000 to 2010 from the University of Delaware Air Temperature
and Precipitation data set22,23. We aggregate this gridded temperature data to REMIND
regions using 2005 population24 as weights ix.
From 2005 on, regional temperature depends on global mean temperature Tt and the




T¯t − T¯2005︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κr,t
(Tt − T2005) ,
where Tt is the global mean temperature from the MAGICC6 model and the temperatures
from CMIP5 are T¯t and T¯r,t.
We use statistical downscaling to derive κr,t: We use gridded global mean temperature
anomaly data from CMIP5 at 2.5 degree resolution25. We choose the mean across all
CMIP5 models for the RCP2.6 scenario, as our model ensemble has climate outcomes
close to RCP2.6. We aggregate these data down to REMIND regions using constant
2005 population weights with 0.1 degree resolution24. The resulting κr,t are all greater
than one (as land tends to warm faster than the oceans), and range from slightly above
1 in Latin America and South-east Asia to 1.6 in Russia (when averaged over the 21st
century).
viiiThe endogenous model derives optimal climate policy by optimization of global welfare, aggregated
from regional utilities using Negishi weights. The optimal carbon price is then the shadow price of the
equation aggregating global emissions. For details on this solution procedure, see Leimbach et al. [14].
ixThis aggregation multiplies temperature and population at every grid cell, sums up all grid cells in
a model region, and normalizes to total population in that region. The resulting population-weighted
temperature is strictly speaking not a physical quantity, but, we argue, the temperature value most
relevant to economic activity and thus climate damages.
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4 Temperature impulse response
We here characterize the temperature impulse response (TIR) which is used in the evalu-
ation of the SCC and the guardrail tax. The TIR is the global mean temperature increase
due to an additional unit of emissions. We derive it for CO2 emissions here and con-
vert other greenhouse gases to CO2-equivalents through global warming potentials before
pricing them in.
The shape of the TIR for CO2 emissions is a key finding of climate science: Tempera-
ture rises for around a decade following the emission, levels off, and stays constant for
more than 100 years26–28. The amount of temperature increase is closely related to the
transient response to cumulative emissions (TCRE)26,27,29. The shape of the TIR is quite
independent of the emissions scenario, but we still use the MAGICC6 model to derive
∆Tt′,t specifically for the emissions pathway from the REMIND model.
We derive the TIR from a pulse experiment using MAGICC6. Since the dependence of
the TIR on the pulse size is negligible on the scale of today’s emissions, we choose an
emissions pulse of 1GtC on top of the emissions path (from REMIND) at different times
between 2010 and 2150. The TIR is then fed back into REMIND, used for the evaluation
of the SCC, and updated iteratively.
For an overview of the resulting TIRs, see Fig. ED3b, which agrees well with results of
more elaborated models26,27,29,30.
5 Discounting
Discounting strongly influences the social cost of carbon and the guardrail tax. The
welfare economic framework used here, a Ramsey-type infinitely-lived-agent model, does
not distinguish private discounting of households from social discounting. Allowing for a
meaningful evaluation of different discounting choices requires a model that distinguishes
private discounting, consistent with observed market outcomes, from social discounting
based on ethical choices (along with other parameters based on ethical choices, such
as inequality aversion). There are many arguments to use social discount rates much
below private discount rates in the evaluation of climate policy31–33. The results of a
model distinguishing private and social discounting would only coincide with a simple
Ramsey framework if private and social preferences were equal, no other fiscal distortions
were present, and access to lump-sum transfers between individuals of different ages were
possible34. These conditions are clearly not perfectly fulfilled in the real world, leaving
much room for future studies.
As the main point of this paper is to highlight the differences between LTC and CEA
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pathways, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the discount rate used in the evaluation of
the SCC and the guardrail tax. For a a discount rate of ∼3% p.a., in contrast to the ∼5%
p.a. in our default case, we find that median LTC emissions in 2030 decreases by around
7.3 GtCO2eq yr
−1, while the CEA emissions in 2030 decreases by around 2.3 GtCO2eq
yr−1. The optimal 2030 LTC carbon tax increases to around US✩300. Note that this
sensitivity analysis can only be seen as a rough indication, for the reasons discussed in
the last paragraph. To properly assess the influence of the discount rate on optimal policy,
social and private discounting would have to be distinguished concerning all decisions in
the economy, not just in the evaluation of optimal climate policy.
6 Uncertainty in empirical specifications
As discussed in Section 1.1 of the Supplementary Material we include both the ”long
run” and the ”short run” specification of Burke et al. (2015) in the analysis. As shown in
Fig. 9 the ”long run” specification, which takes into account temperature lags of the 5
preceding years, leads to much higher damages, more stringent mitigation and therefore
slightly lower warming by the end of the century. With increasing persistence times, the
differences between the effects of the two specifications increase, as damages accumulate
when the growth rate is affected. However, the debate is still open whether climate change
really affects the growth rate35,36 or is a level effect37.
The damage specification has a strong effect on the difference between LTC and CEA
pathways. As shown in Fig. 10 the gap in 2030 emissions is considerably larger for the
”long run” specification than for the ”short run”. As additional sensitivity we perform
the calculations using the damage the specification by Burke & Tanutama [38] who re-
peat the analysis of Burke et al. (2015) with subnational GDP data. They confirm the
non-linear relationship between temperature and income, but find a much lower optimal
temperature of below 10➦ compared to around 13➦ before. This increases the negative
effects of additional warming, as more countries are at or above the optimal temperature
than before. The effects of this specification without lags is comparable to the lagged
specification of Burke et al. (2015) (”long-run”, see Fig. 10). This further highlights the
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Burke (pooled, long−run) Burke (pooled, short−run) DICE2016 Least Total Cost (LTC) 
Supplementary Figure 1: Climate damages on GDP. a, our damage function for the
growth rate δ(Tr,t) over temperature increase above pre-industrial and b, the cumulative
damage factor Dr,t over time, both in global aggregate (LTC, blue), compared to the lit-
erature. Comparisons are made with two estimates from Burke et al. [1] (red and black)
and the DICE2016 function10,39 (pink). We implemented their damage functions into our
model framework as alternative LTC-type pathways towards 2◦C. The Burke et al. dam-
ages show infinite persistence time of damage shocks, while the DICE2016 damages have
zero persistence (see Fig. 2). Our damage factor uses a range of finite persistence times
around a mean of 15 years and the original Burke specification. The statistics are over
climate uncertainty in all cases and additionally over the damage function specifications
in the LTC case (lines: median, shades: 20-80th percentile).
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Our damage factor, 
 finite persistence
b
Supplementary Figure 2: Persistence of shocks is key to climate damages. Two
stylized temperature signals in a, a one-off shock and a permanent increase above the
historical mean, are translated into b, damage factors (Eq. 3). DICE-like damage func-
tions assume no persistence at all (light blue; τH = 0). For infinite persistence (dark
blue; τH =∞), the damage function eventually approaches zero in response to a perma-
nent temperature increase, as is the case for the original damage factor from Burke et al.
[1]. Our damage factor uses a range of finite nonzero persistence times (median blue;
τH ∈ [5, 30] years): The impact of a one-off temperature shock on the economy vanishes
exponentially; shocks from a permanent increase in temperature compound to a rising
damage factor that eventually levels off.
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Supplementary Figure 3: Global emissions in LTC and CEA settings. Replication
of Main Figure 5 but for total emissions in units of Gt CO2eq yr
−1 instead of CO2-
only emissions. Note that global warming potentials from the IPCC Second Assessment
Report are used for this calculation. The gap between 2030 emissions under the NDCs
and the optimal mitigation pathways increases by 50% when damages are included (LTC)
compared to the standard CEA analysis. The LTC pathway is in line with the goal set
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Supplementary Figure 4: Global mean temperature response. a, peak and end-of-
century temperature outcomes for LTC and CEA pathways. b, the temperature impulse
response for different MAGICC6 climate model configurations (colors). Darker colors
indicate MAGICC6 configurations at higher percentiles in the temperature outcome for a
RCP2.6 scenario (Methods for details). The plot shows the temperature impulse response
over time after the CO2 emission pulse; lines of the same color belong to pulse emission
times between 2020 and 2100. There is good agreement with the literature26,27,29,30. Also














































Least Total Cost (LTC) Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
Supplementary Figure 5: Sensitivity to the choice of carbon budget. The carbon
budget influences the stringency of near-term LTC mitigation less strongly than in the
CEA case. a) compares emissions and b) carbon prices in 2030 across across three
carbon budgets: The default budget of 1300 GtCO2 (in alignment with the 2
◦C target of
the Paris agreement); a budget of 900 GtCO2 (1.5
◦C target); and a 2800 GtCO2 budget







































    DICE2016
Guardrail tax SCC
Supplementary Figure 6: The SCC component dominates the carbon tax in LTC.
The mean SCC tax (blue) and mean guardrail tax (violet) over time (each as mean over
the LTC pathway ensemble). The SCC rises much slower over time than the exponential
guardrail tax. As level damages for the DICE specification are so small, the guardrail tax
dominates in that case(right panel), while the SCC dominates for Burke-type growth-rate
























Supplementary Figure 7: The SCC rises more or less linearly with GDP. The
SCC component of the optimal carbon price relative to GDP for all LTC pathways over
time (mean in black). A roughly linear dependence of the SCC on GDP is suggested by
simpler models11,12. While the SCC in our LTC pathways are far form strictly linear, the















































Least Total Cost (LTC) Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) NDCs
Supplementary Figure 8: The main results are partly driven by lower tempera-
ture outcomes in LTC. Carbon prices (a) and emissions (b), including only the subset
of LTC pathways for which the emissions budget is binding (around 53% of all). The
gap between LTC and CEA pathways shrinks somewhat, the median LTC carbon price
is US✩88.5 per tonne of CO2 and global emissions 30.5 GtCO2 in 2030. The pathways
with non-binding budget which are excluded happen to be the ones where the realiza-
tion of uncertainties includes severe damages, or high climate sensitivity. Compared to
our default results, the LTC pathway shown here is not optimal, as the pathways with
non-binding budget were excluded in the derivation of the optimal policy.
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Supplementary Figure 9: Social cost of carbon for ”short run” vs. ”long run”
specification. The 2030 social cost of carbon (panel a) and global mean temperature in
2100 (panel b) under cost-benefit analysis for different persistence times, but separating











































Least Total Cost (LTC) Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
Supplementary Figure 10: Effect of uncertainty in damage specification. Stronger
damages widen the gap between LTC and CEA considerably. ”Burke SR” and ”Burke
LR” refer to the different specifications of damages in Burke et al. (2015). The ”short
run” specification does not capture lagged effects of temperature, while the ”long run”
specification takes into account the effects of the 5 preceding years. ”BT2019” refers
to the ”short run” specification found in Burke & Tanutama [38], based on subnational
instead of country-level income data. The ensemble contains the uncertainty from the
level of persistence as well as the climate uncertainty.
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